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Abstract
Similar to software bugs, conﬁguration errors are also
oneofthe majorcausesoftoday’ssystemfailures. Many
conﬁguration issues manifest themselves in ways simi-
lar to software bugs such as crashes, hangs, silent fail-
ures. It leaves users clueless and forced to report to de-
velopers for technical support, wasting not only users’
but also developers’ precious time and effort. Unfortu-
nately, unlike software bugs, many software developers
takea muchless active,responsibleroleinhandlingcon-
ﬁguration errors because “they are users’ faults.”
This paper advocates the importance for software de-
velopers to take an active role in handling misconﬁgu-
rations. It also makes a concrete ﬁrst step towards this
goal by providingtooling support to help developersim-
prove their conﬁguration design, and harden their sys-
tems against conﬁguration errors. Speciﬁcally, we build
a tool, called SPEX, to automatically infer conﬁguration
requirements (referred to as constraints) from software
source code, and then use the inferred constraints to: (1)
exposemisconﬁgurationvulnerabilities(i.e., badsystem
reactions to conﬁguration errors such as crashes, hangs,
silent failures); and (2) detect certain types of error-
prone conﬁguration design and handling.
We evaluate SPEX with one commercial storage sys-
tem and six open-source server applications. SPEX au-
tomatically infers a total of 3800 constraints for more
than2500conﬁgurationparameters. Basedonthesecon-
straints, SPEX further detects 743 various misconﬁgu-
ration vulnerabilities and at least 112 error-prone con-
straints in the latest versions of the evaluated systems.
To this day, 364 vulnerabilities and 80 inconsistent con-
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straints have been conﬁrmedor ﬁxed by developersafter
we reported them. Our results have inﬂuenced the Squid
Web proxy project to improve its conﬁguration parsing
library towards a more user-friendly design.
Categories and Subject Descriptors: D.4.5 [Operating
Systems]: Reliability
General Terms: Reliability, Design
Keywords: Misconﬁguration, Constraint, Inference,
Testing, Vulnerability
1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Conﬁguration errors are one of the major causes of to-
day’s system failures. For example, Barroso and H¨ olzle
report that misconﬁgurationsare the second major cause
of service-level failures at one of Google’s main ser-
vices [6]. Similar ﬁndings are reported in other stud-
ies [12,22,24,27]. Recently, several systems, including
Microsoft Azure, Amazon EC2, and Facebook, expe-
rienced a number of misconﬁguration-induced outages
that affected millions of their customers [2,13,31].
Infact,misconﬁgurationsaffectnotonlyendusers but
also support and software engineers, because they need
to spend time and effort in troubleshooting and correct-
ing them [8,14]. A recent study [36] shows that con-
ﬁguration issues account for 27% of customer support
cases in a majorstoragecompany. Regardlessofthe root
causes (software bugs or misconﬁgurations), the system
often misbehaves with similar symptoms (e.g., crashes,
missing functionalities, incorrect results). This leaves
users no choice but to report the problems to the techni-
cal support. When support engineers are misled by such
ambiguous symptoms, the diagnosis can take an unnec-
essarily long time [36].
Recently, many research efforts have been conducted
to address the misconﬁguration problem including trou-
bleshootinganomaliescausedbyconﬁgurationerrors[1,
3,4,5,25,32,33,34,37,40], detecting certain types of
misconﬁgurations [11,35,38], automating certain con-
244ﬁgurationtasks [7,9,17], and some others [15,19,26,28,
30,36]. Allthesestudiesfocusonparameter-relatedmis-
conﬁgurations,as they accountfor the majority of users’
conﬁguration errors [36]. Similarly, this paper also fo-
cuses on parameter-related misconﬁgurations.
While the previous work has signiﬁcantly improved
the situation by providing the last level of defense, the
fundamentalproblemof misconﬁgurationsprobablylies
in the conﬁguration design and the target system itself.
Unfortunately,not much attention has been paid to these
two, partially due to our (software developers’) attitude
towards misconﬁgurations(whichis quite differentfrom
how we treat software bugs). For software bugs, devel-
opers typically take a responsibleand active role. This is
reﬂected in many ways, such as various choices of bug-
tracking databases, patch releases, unit/regression tests,
andbugcheckers. Incontrast,developersoftentakelaid-
back roles in handling misconﬁgurations because “they
are users’ faults.” Such an attitude is reﬂected in two
main aspects: (1) Misconﬁgurations are much less rig-
orously tracked; and (2) After a conﬁguration error is
identiﬁed as the root cause, developers often do not take
any further action, such as changing the code or releas-
ing patches in order to avoid the same misconﬁgurations
by other users (which is often the case).
In most cases, even though it is the users who com-
mit the conﬁguration errors, they should not take all the
blame. After all, a misconﬁguration is referred to as an
“error” simply because it does not match our (software
developers’) requirements for conﬁguration. Therefore,
beforeblamingusersforconﬁgurationerrors,weneedto
question whether we have the right requirements in the
ﬁrst place. Forexample,areweassumingtoomuchfrom
users? Users do not write our code and sometimes can-
notreadourcode. Howcouldtheyhavethesamelevelof
understandingof the requirementsand impact of various
conﬁguration settings as we do? Are our conﬁguration
requirements too strict or too confusing? After all, users
are human beings, and just like us, also make mistakes,
especially when the requirements are error-prone.
Moreover, while we are often trained and educated to
implement our code to tolerate hardware and network
errors, we place little emphasis on tolerating or reacting
gracefullyto users’conﬁgurationerrors. In fact, just like
hardware errors, human errors are a force of nature, too.
Unfortunately,inreality,developersoftenunconsciously
assume correct conﬁgurations. As a result, many con-
ﬁguration errors lead to system crashes, hangs, incorrect
results, etc.,leavinguserscluelessandforcedtoreportto
support engineers for assistance in failure diagnosis. On
the other hand, if the software could pinpointthe conﬁg-
uration errors with explicit log messages, users could di-
rectly ﬁx their mistakes by themselves without resorting
to the technical support. Different from software bugs,
InitiatorName: iqn.time.domain:TARGET
Misconfiguration:
Symptom:
The storage share cannot be recognized.
Root Cause:
InitiatorName only allows lowercase letters, while the user sets the name
with the capital letters ފTARGETފ.
Diagnosis Efforts
75 rounds of communication
10 collections of system logs
Figure 1: A real-world example from a commercial com-
pany. The conﬁguration constraint was too strict and users
made mistakes despite two documents explaining it.
listener-threads 32
Misconfiguration:
Symptom:
Crash after server startup with the only
log message: ފSegmentation faultފ.
Root Cause:
OpenLDAP only supports a hard-coded
maximum of 16 listener threads.
The user manual does not
mention this limit.
Developer's Response:
Refused to change the source
code and the manual because
the setting is not valid.
Figure 2: A real-world example from OpenLDAP. The
server crashes when “listener-threads” is set to be larger
than 16. More real-world examples are given in Figure 7.
if accurate error messages are provided by the system,
most conﬁguration errors can be easily ﬁxed by users
themselves. Therefore, providing good reactions to con-
ﬁguration errors can signiﬁcantly reduce the number of
issues reported to support engineers.
Figures 1 and 2 give two real-world examples to fur-
ther illustrate the points above. As shown in Figure 1,
a commercial system1 required users to type all low-
ercase letters to conﬁgure the initiator names of iSCSI
adapters. This requirement is too strict. As a result, sev-
eral customers made mistakes and had to call the com-
pany to help troubleshoot the problem. In this particular
case, the diagnosis took over 75 rounds of communica-
tionwith thecustomeras well as 10roundsofdebugging
message collection. It resulted in not only customers’
downtime but also high supporting cost.
The second example, as shown in Figure 2, is from
the latest version of OpenLDAP. With the parameter,
“listener-threads”, conﬁgured to be larger than 16, the
LDAP server would crash after startup with “segmenta-
tion fault.” The crash symptom misled at least two users
to report it as a software bug. This problem is detected
by our tool. Unfortunately, after we reported this prob-
lem, the developer refused to take any action, such as
changing the conﬁguration design, editing the manual
entry, or adding code to check the value and printout ex-
plicit error messages. This was mainly due to the com-
mon attitude many developers have towards conﬁgura-
tion errors: “It is not a bug, but an invalid setting.”
Of course, not all developers are like this. Some de-
velopers have a more responsible attitude towards han-
dling conﬁguration errors. For example, after we re-
ported the misconﬁguration vulnerabilities (bad system
1We are required to keep the company and the product anonymous.
245reactions to conﬁguration errors such as crashes, hangs,
silent failures) and error-prone constraints to Squid (an
open-source Web proxy and cache server), Squid devel-
opers ﬁxed the reported problems immediately. Also,
the large U.S. commercial companywe worked with has
been very cooperative, allowing us to publish our evalu-
ation results of their system.
Certainly, the ultimate solutions to avoid misconﬁg-
urations are auto-conﬁguration and completely rethink-
ing, redesigning conﬁguration to prevent user mistakes.
While these solutions are revolutionary and fundamen-
tal, theyarechallengingandprobablyprohibitivelydifﬁ-
cult, because they have to balance two conﬂicting goals:
usability and ﬂexibility (to adjust the system). In addi-
tion, not every conﬁguration parameter can be automat-
ically conﬁgured. Moreover, few user studies have been
conducted to design conﬁguration in better ways.
1.2 Our Contributions
In this paper, we make one of the ﬁrst steps towards tak-
ingan activerole inhandlingmisconﬁgurations. Ourap-
proach is more evolutionaryand practical. Specially, the
solutions and proposed changes in this paper can easily
be adopted by existing software systems. In particular,
we aim at improving the conﬁguration design of today’s
software systems by (1) hardening systems against con-
ﬁgurationerrors; and(2) detectingcertaintypes of error-
prone conﬁguration design and handling.
Achieving the above goals would need the speciﬁca-
tion of conﬁguration requirements referred to as con-
ﬁguration constraints in this paper. A constraint for a
conﬁguration parameter speciﬁes its data type, format,
value range, dependency and correlation with other pa-
rameters, etc., in order to conﬁgure the parameter cor-
rectly. Since large-scale systems usually contain hun-
dreds or even thousands of conﬁguration parameters,
it is time-consuming and error-prone to let developers
specify each constraint manually [16]. Another solution
is to leverage user manuals. Unfortunately, manuals are
written in natural languages and are hard to analyze au-
tomatically. Moreover, user manuals are often incom-
plete and outdated as shown in a recent study [26].
As source code always contains up-to-date informa-
tion, our idea is to automaticallyinferconﬁgurationcon-
straints from source code by analyzing how the conﬁgu-
ration parameters are read and used. We implement our
ideaina toolcalled SPEX. Furthermore,SPEX leverages
the inferred conﬁguration constraints to: (1) harden sys-
tems against misconﬁgurations by injecting errors that
violate the constraints, in order to expose misconﬁg-
uration vulnerabilities; and (2) detect certain types of
error-prone conﬁguration design and handling, in order
to make them more user-friendly.
We evaluate SPEX with the latest versions of one
commercial system from a major U.S. storage vendor,
and six open-source server software including Apache,
MySQL, PostgreSQL, OpenLDAP, VSFTP, and Squid.
SPEX automatically infers a total of 3800 constraints
for more than 2500 conﬁguration parameters. Based
on these constraints, it exposes 743 misconﬁguration
vulnerabilities that caused system misbehavior such as
crashes, hangs, indeterminate failures, etc. It also de-
tects at least 112 error-prone conﬁguration constraints.
To this day, 364 vulnerabilities and 80 error-prone con-
straints have been conﬁrmedor ﬁxed by developersafter
we reported them. Section 5 reports our experiences in
interacting with developers during our work and some
goodpractices we have observed. Our results have inﬂu-
enced the Squid Web proxy server to improveits conﬁg-
urationlibrarytowardsa moreuser-friendlydesign,ben-
eﬁting morethan 150conﬁgurationparametersin Squid.
2 Conﬁguration Constraint Inference
This section describes the design and implementation
of SPEX, a tool that automatically infers conﬁguration
constraints (i.e., rules that differentiate correct conﬁg-
urations from misconﬁgurations) from source code. In
the next section, we will discuss how we use such con-
straints to expose misconﬁguration vulnerabilities, and
to detect error-prone conﬁguration design and handling.
SPEX requires the target software’s source code and
simple annotations as a starting point to help identify
and analyze conﬁguration parameters in source code. In
thissection,weﬁrst describewhatkindsofconﬁguration
constraints we can infer and then discuss how to infer
them. Finally, we discuss the limitations, in particular,
what kinds of constraints cannot be inferred by SPEX.
2.1 What Constraints Can Be Inferred?
Many conﬁguration requirements are reﬂected in the
software’s source code. Examples include data types,
formats, value ranges, multi-parameter dependencies,
etc. Some of these can be automatically inferred via
static code analysis by leveraging the properties of vari-
ous operations and system/library APIs when accessing
(readingor assigning to) conﬁguration-relatedvariables.
Of course, as we will discuss in Section 2.3, not all
conﬁguration constraints are reﬂected in source code or
can be automatically inferred via static analysis. This
work provides a ﬁrst step in this direction. Our evalu-
ation has shown promising results with even a modest
real-world impact on both commercial and open-source
software, as brieﬂy presented in Section 4.1.
SPEX analyzes source code and infers constraints that
manifest through concrete, recognizable program pat-
246Transforming from char* type
to 32-bit integer type
MySQL-5.5.29
int ft_init_stopwords(«) { ...
fd = my_open(ft_stopword_file, ...) ...
}
File my_open(const char *FileName, ...) {
/* mysys/my_open.c */
fd = open((char *) FileName, Flags);
...
...
}
(b) Semantic-type constraint (FILE)
/* storage/myisam/ft_stopwords.c */
Code Snippets: Ӏft_stopword_fileӀ
Constraint Inferred:
The semantic type of Ӏft_stopword_fileӀ is a FILE.
(c) Semantic-type constraint (PORT)
static int *config_generic(ConfigArgs *c)
{ ...
if (c->value_int < 4)
c->value_int = 4;
else if (c->value_int > 255)
c->value_int = 255;
OpenLDAP-2.4.33
...
/* servers/slapd/bconfig.c */
Code Snippets:
Ӏindex_intlenӀ
(d) Data-range constraint
Constraint Inferred:
The valid range of Ӏindex_intlenӀ is 4 to 255.
ӀfsyncӀ static TransactionId
RecordTransactionCommit() { ...
if( enableFsync &&
MinimumActiveBackends(CommitSiblings))
/* access/transam/xact.c */
PostgreSQL-9.2.1
}
Control dep.
Code Snippets:
...
}
(e) Control-dependency constraint
Ӏcommit_siblingsӀ
/* All Ӏcommit_siblingsӀ 's usages
are inside the func. call. */
Constraint Inferred:
Ӏcommit_siblingsӀ takes effect only when ӀfsyncӀ
is not set as zero.
MySQL-5.5.29
/* storage/myisam/ft_parser.c */
uchar ft_get_word(...) { ...
if( length >= ft_min_word_len && ...
length < ft_max_word_len ) ) {
... //full-text operations
}
Code Snippets:
(f) Value-relationship constraint
Ӏft_min_word_lenӀ
Ӏft_max_word_lenӀ
Constraint Inferred:
Ӏft_max_word_lenӀ should be greater than
Ӏft_min_word_lenӀ.
(a) Basic-type constraint
Storage-A
Constraint Inferred:
Code Snippets: Ӏlog.filesizeӀ
...
The basic data type of Ӏlog.filesizeӀ is a 32-bit
integer number.
static char *set_max_ranges(..., char *arg, ...)
{ ...
int val = strtoll(arg, NULL, 0);
}
Squid-3.2.5
Code Snippets:
Constraint Inferred:
The semantic type of Ӏudp_portӀ is a PORT.
/* src/icp_v2.cc */
...
void icpOpenPorts() { ...
icpIncomingConn->local.SetPort(port);
unsigned short
Ip::Address::SetPort(unsigned short prt) {
m_SocketAddress.sin6_port = htons(prt);
}
}
Ӏudp_portӀ
...
...
/* prt is passed to the sin6_port of
struct sockaddr_in6 */
/* src/ip/Address.cc */
}
Figure 3: Real-world examples to illustrate what conﬁguration constraints our SPEX infers. The arrows show the data-
ﬂow, which motivates SPEX to do data-ﬂow analysis. Conﬁguration parameters are quoted in the ﬁgure, and the program
variables that store the parameters are shaded. Section 2.2 explains how these constraints are inferred.
terns. These constraints can be classiﬁed into attributes
and correlations. The former deﬁne the correct settings
of a parameter, while the latter specify the correlations
among multiple parameters. Figure 3 gives several con-
crete real-world examples of various kinds of conﬁgura-
tion constraints our SPEX infers. We describe each kind
in more detail as follows. The next subsection will ex-
plain in detail how SPEX infers them, starting from how
it identiﬁes conﬁguration variables in source code.
Data Type: To set a conﬁguration parameter correctly,
users ﬁrst need to know the expected data type. We call
such constraints type constraints. There are two classes
of data types for conﬁguration parameters: basic types
and semantic types. The basic-type constraint speci-
ﬁes a parameter’svalue by the low-leveldata representa-
tion including integer, character, boolean, ﬂoating-point
number, string, etc.
However, basic types alone may not be sufﬁcient. For
example, a “string” parameter may refer to either a ﬁle
path or an IP address. Each such semantic type has its
ownspeciﬁc requirements. Forexample,a ﬁle pathhas a
speciﬁc path-likeformatandshouldrepresenta validﬁle
in the ﬁle system. In addition to the “ﬁle path” and “IP
address” types, there are many other types such as user
name, port number, timeout, etc. In SPEX, we support
the high-level semantic types of most standard libraries.
Figures 3(a), (b), and (c) show three real-world exam-
ples of type constraints inferred by SPEX. In the ﬁrst
example, via static code analysis, SPEX infers the pa-
rameter, “log.ﬁlesize”, to be a 32-bit integer number.
Figure 3(b) gives an example of the “FILE” type, and
Figure 3(c) shows an example of the “PORT” type.
Value Range: Conﬁguration parameters may be further
constrained by some acceptable ranges of valid values,
such as minimum and maximum values or a list of ac-
ceptable values as in the enumerative type. Figure 3(d)
shows a range constraint inferred by SPEX from OpenL-
DAP, in which, as the code indicates, “index intlen”
needs to be between 4 and 255.
Control Dependency: Multiple conﬁguration parame-
ters might have dependencies. Often, the resolution to
problems like, “Why does my setting of parameter A not
work?” is simply, “Turn on parameter B.” When such
dependenciesare neither documentedin the manual, nor
pinpointed explicitly by log messages, it is difﬁcult for
users to ﬁgure them out. Such constraints are typically
manifested as control dependencies in source code.
Formally, we deﬁne the control dependency of two
parameters as (P,V,⋄)  → Q which means that the usage
of parameter Q relies on the setting of parameter P, un-
dertheconditionofP⋄V, where⋄∈{<,>,=, =,≥,≤},
andV is a constant value. Figure 3(e) shows an example
247from PostgreSQL, where “commit siblings” takes effect
only when “fsync” is non-zero.
Value Relationship: In addition to the control depen-
dency between two parameters, the relationship of their
values may also impose constraints. For example, in
Figure 3(f), the value of “ft max word len” should be
greater than that of “ft min word len”.
2.2 How to Infer Constraints?
To infer conﬁguration constraints, SPEX ﬁrst needs to
identify conﬁguration variables in source code. It then
tracks the data-ﬂow of each program variable corre-
spondingtotheconﬁgurationparameter,andrecordsany
constraint that is discovered along the data-ﬂow path.
We implement SPEX’s analysis to be inter-procedural,
context-sensitive, and ﬁeld-sensitive. Inter-procedure is
necessary because conﬁguration parameters are com-
monly passed through function calls. SPEX also needs
to be ﬁeld-sensitive because conﬁguration parameters
could be stored in composite data types. SPEX is built
on top of the LLVM compiler infrastructure [18].
As a design choice, we do not use symbolic execution
for SPEX. Symbolic execution is able to explore all the
possible code paths in the program for the given input.
However, it suffers from path explosion when applied to
large systems such as Storage-A. Moreover,as shown in
Section 2, SPEX looks for concrete code patterns on the
data-ﬂow path of each conﬁguration parameter, which
does not ﬁt the strength of symbolic execution.
SPEX scans the source code twice. In the ﬁrst pass, it
infers the data-ﬂow path of each parameter and looks for
data-type and data-range constraints for each parameter.
To further infer constraints involving multiple parame-
ters (i.e., control dependencies and value relationships),
SPEX scans thecodeagain, butthis time onlyonthe pro-
gram slice containing the data-ﬂow of each parameter.
2.2.1 Mapping Parameters to Variables
To start constraint inference, SPEX has to know the pro-
gram variables that store the values of conﬁguration pa-
rameters. Different software projects may have differ-
ent conventions. We observe that developers often use
clean interface to manage the mapping information. By
examining 18 widely-used software projects (shown in
Table 1), we ﬁnd that all but one of them map conﬁgu-
ration parameters into program variables via one of the
three interfaces: structure, comparison, and container.
Correspondingly, SPEX provides three template toolkits
to extract the mapping information with minimal anno-
tation efforts.
In structure-based mapping, data structures are used
to directly map each conﬁguration parameter to the cor-
Software Desc. Type Software Desc. Type
Storage-A Storage struct Squid Proxy comparison
MySQL DB struct Redis DB comparison
PostgreSQL DB struct ntpd NTP comparison
Apache httpd Web struct CVS SCM comparison
lighttpd Web struct Hypertable DB container
Ngnix Web struct MongoDB DB container
OpenSSH SSH struct AOLServer Web container
Postﬁx Email struct Subversion SCM container
VSFTP FTP struct OpenLDAP LDAP hybrid
Table 1: Parameter-to-variable mapping in 18 software
projects. All of them fall into one of the three conventions:
structure, container, comparison, or their combinations.
struct config_int ConfigureNamesInt[] =
{ { "deadlock_timeout",
char* set_document_root(..., char * arg) {
static command_rec core_cmds[] = {
AP_INIT_TAKE1("DocumentRoot",
set_document_root, ... ),
void obtain_master_lock(...) { ...
} }
} else if(...)
void loadServerConfig(...) { ...
if (!strcasecmp(argv[0],"timeout")) {
server.maxidletime = atoi(argv[1]);
/* src/config.c */
uint32_t retry_interval =
context->props->
get_i32("Connection.Retry.Interval");
...
/* src/cc/Hypertable/Master/main.cc */
(a) Structure-based mapping (direct) (b) Structure-based mapping (function)
(c) Comparison-based mapping (d) Container-based mapping
/* src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c */ /* server/core.c */
PostgreSQL-9.2.1 Apache-httpd-2.4.1
Redis-2.4.17 Hypertable-0.9.6.4
}
...
...
&DeadlockTimeout,
...,
...,},
};
};
...
...
{ @STRUCT = ConfigureNamesInt
@PAR = [config_int, 1]
@VAR = [config_int, 3] }
{ @STRUCT = core_cmds
@PAR = [command_rec, 1]
@VAR = ([command_rec, 2], $arg) }
{ @PARSER = loadServerConfig
@PAR = $argv[0]
@VAR = $argv[1] }
{ @GETTER = get_i32
@PAR = 1
@VAR = $RET }
...
Annotation˖
...
82 mapping in this structure
103 mapping in this structure
Code Snippets˖ Code Snippets˖
Annotation˖
Code Snippets˖ Code Snippets˖
51 mapping in the function
Annotation˖ Annotation˖
the getter function
Figure 4: Examples of mapping conventions, and the cor-
responding annotations to get the mapping information.
responding variable(s) in source code [as shown in Fig-
ure 4(a)], or to the parsing function [as shown in Fig-
ure 4(b)]. In the former case, developers only need to
provide the structure variable’s name and each speciﬁc
ﬁeld. For Figure 4(a), three lines of annotations are suf-
ﬁcient to extract the mapping informationof 82 parame-
ters in PostgreSQL. In the latter case, developersneed to
further annotate which parameter in the parsing function
is the conﬁguration variable [e.g., arg in Figure 4(b)].
Comparison-based mapping, as shown in Figure 4(c),
uses string comparison functions (e.g., strcasecmp) to
match parameters. It further assigns values to the vari-
ables in the branch blocks. SPEX recognizes standard
string comparison functions. In this case, developers
needtoannotatetheparsingfunctionandtheinitialinput
variables holding the parameter names and values.
Container-basedmapping,exempliﬁedin Figure 4(d),
stores all the conﬁguration parameters in a central con-
tainer and uses common getter functions to retrieve the
248value. In such cases, developers need to annotate the
getter functions (typically only a few).
By asking developers to annotate the mapping inter-
faces rather than every mappingpair, the toolkits require
a limited amount of information from developers. In the
evaluation, the number of annotations needed for most
software is less than 10, as shown in Table 4. Note: The
annotationonlyrequiresmodestunderstandingofsource
code. The conﬁguration-related code is usually modu-
larized and can be found by simply searching parameter
names in source code (e.g., using grep).
Starting from the annotations, the SPEX toolkits infer
the mapping information in the form of key-value pairs:
(“parameter name”, variable name). For example,
the key-valuepair in Figure 4(a) is (“deadlock timeout”,
DeadlockTimeout). In the remainder of this section,
we refer to the variables storing the parameters’ values
as “parameters,” to simplify our description.
2.2.2 Data Type Inference
Basic Type: SPEX infers each parameter’s basic type
from its type information in source code. On the data-
ﬂow path of a parameter, its type might be casted mul-
tiple times. In such cases, we record the type after the
ﬁrst casting as the basic type, because it is common for
a parameter to be ﬁrst stored as a string (e.g., a char
array) before being transformed into its real type. Fig-
ure 3(a) shows an example from the commercial soft-
ware Storage-A, in which the parameter is converted
from a string to a 32-bit integer. Thus, the basic-type
constraint of “log.ﬁlesize” is inferred as 32-bit integer.
Semantic Type: SPEX infers semantic-type constraints
by searching the following patterns along a parameter’s
entire data-ﬂow path: (1) the parameter is passed to a
known function call (e.g., system- and library-call) or a
known data structure; or (2) the parameter is compared
with, or is assigned with, the return value of a known
function call (e.g., the return value of the time syscall).
Figure 3(b) shows an example from MySQL of the
ﬁrst pattern. In this example, SPEX infers the semantic
type of “ft stopword ﬁle” to be a ﬁle path because it is
used in the open syscall. Note: SPEX searches such
patterns along the entire data-ﬂow path, even after the
parameter is modiﬁed, because the modiﬁcation seldom
affects the semantic type. For example, a ﬁle path after
canonicalization is still used as a ﬁle path.
Currently, SPEX supports standard library APIs and
data types. In addition, we also allow developers to im-
port their own library APIs and data types by pointingto
their header ﬁles. For example, for the commercial stor-
age software used in our evaluation,we also importedits
proprietarylibrary APIs. For constraint inference,the li-
brary APIs included in .h ﬁles are enough, but for mis-
conﬁguration injection described in the next section, we
need developers to provide types of conﬁguration errors
to inject for each customized data type. Note: They do
notneedto providesuchinformationfortypes deﬁnedin
standard libraries. In our evaluation, such customization
is used only for the commercial storage system.
2.2.3 Data Range Inference
SPEX infers range constraints when the parameter is
compared with constant values in conditional branches.
SPEX infers two types of ranges: numeric and enumera-
tive. For numeric comparison, SPEX treats the constant
numbers as thresholds of the data range. Enumerative
ranges are inferred if the parameter is used in switch
statements or “if...else if...else” logics.
Foreachrangeinferred, SPEX furtherdecideswhether
therangeis validornotbyanalyzingtheprogrambehav-
ior within the corresponding branch blocks. The reason
for inferring such information is to guide misconﬁgu-
ration injection to expose bad system reactions. If in
the branch block, the program exits, aborts, returns error
code, or resets the parameter, SPEX treats the range as
invalid. Otherwise, it is valid. Figure 3(d) shows an ex-
ample of range inference from OpenLDAP, in which the
range of “index intlen” is divided into (−∞,4), [4,255],
and (255,+∞). Both (−∞,4) and (255,+∞) are in-
valid because the parameters are reset in those ranges.
The default in a switch statement or the last else
in “if...else if...else” logics is also treated as
invalid. Please note: Since such information is used
to guide misconﬁgurationinjection, some false positives
are nota majorconcern. It just wastes some testing time.
As a good practice, range constraints should be ex-
plicitly documented, but this is not always the case. As
shown in Figure 3(d), OpenLDAP limits index lengths
within [4,255]. However, this constraint is not docu-
mented. If users set out-of-rangevalues, the system mis-
behaves silently, leaving users suspecting it as a bug.
2.2.4 Control Dependency Inference
To infer control dependencies, SPEX starts from the us-
age statements of a parameter Q, and looks for con-
ditional branches that dominate these statements in a
bottom-up manner. If the condition involves the vari-
able that is part of the data-ﬂow of another parameter P,
SPEX records a control dependency between P and Q in
the form of (P,V,⋄)  → Q.
Figure 3(e) gives an example of a control dependency
from PostgreSQL. Starting from the usage statement of
“commit siblings” inside a function call (omitted in the
ﬁgure), SPEX goes backwards to check the conditions
that allow the execution of this usage and infers the de-
pendency: (“fsync”,0, =)  → “commit siblings”. Note:
249Passing a parameter to a function and modifying its
value are not considered as usage because they do not
change program behavior [29]. They have to be used in
branches,arithmeticoperations,andsystem-/library-call
arguments to be considered as usage statements.
However, if we blindly treated every such occurrence
of control dependencies as one constraint, there would
be many false ones. For example, VSFTP has three
parameters: “listen” (for ipv4), “listen ipv6”, and “lis-
ten port”. “listen port” is used after the check of “lis-
ten” and the check of “listen ipv6”. If we blindly gen-
erated two constraints: (“listen”,1,=)  → “listen port”
and (“listen ipv6”,1,=)  → “listen port”, both would be
too strict. To handle this problem, SPEX aggregates
all the inferred control dependencies for each parame-
ter from all control-ﬂow paths, and calculates the MAY-
belief conﬁdenceof each dependencyin a way similar to
[10]. If the conﬁdence exceeds a predeﬁned threshold
(currently set to 0.75), the dependency will be reported.
In the above example, each dependencywill have a con-
ﬁdence of 0.5, not exceeding the threshold. Therefore,
both of them are ﬁltered out.
2.2.5 Value Relationship Inference
Similar to control-dependencyinference, the value rela-
tionship also involves multiple parameters. SPEX looks
for comparison statements in parameters’ usage. If two
variables from different parameters’ data-ﬂow paths are
compared with each other, SPEX infers the value rela-
tionship of the two parameters in the form of P ⋄ Q.
In addition, the value relationship is transitive, which
means it can be transited throughintermediate variables.
Figure 3(f) gives such an example from MySQL that the
min-max relation is transited by a local variable. In the
current prototype of SPEX, we only check one interme-
diate variable for transitivity, which is fast and captures
common cases. SPEX further tries to decide whether the
inferred relationship indicates a valid setting or not, in a
manner similar to that in range-constraint inference.
2.3 Discussion and Limitation
No tool is perfect, and SPEX is no exception. SPEX can-
notinferallconﬁgurationconstraintsanditalsohasfalse
positives, even though our evaluation with commercial
and open-source software has shown good results.
Currently, the constraint inference of SPEX is limited
within the scope of a single program. However, when
we study real-world misconﬁguration issues (presented
in Section 4.2), we ﬁnd that cross-software conﬁgura-
tion correlations also account for a considerable number
of misconﬁgurationcases. Inferringthese constraints re-
quires new techniques to consider the software stacks as
a whole, which remains our future work.
Even within a single program, SPEX does not infer all
constraints. Someconstraintsareprogram-speciﬁcwith-
out common,concrete programpatterns. For example, it
is hard for SPEX to understand the complicated string
manipulation logics used in parsing certain parameters
(e.g., nesting and semi-structured rules), which might
appear in software providingservices of networkingand
access controls (e.g., Bind9, Netﬁlter). Moreover, SPEX
cannot infer all the possible semantics of parameters.
The constraints inferred by SPEX are basic and can-
not capture certain complicated constraints (e.g., depen-
dencies involving complicated compositions of boolean
or arithmetic operations). Fortunately, according to our
inspection, systems seldom have these complicated con-
straints ontheconﬁguration,possiblybecauseuserscan-
not handle such complexity.
Not every constraint inferred by SPEX is a true con-
straint. Section 4.3 provides the evaluation results for
false positives. SPEX’s inference accuracy is above 90%
for most evaluated software. To further improve accu-
racy, we would need developers to manually examine
each constraint and prune out the 10% false ones.
The analysis of SPEX works on LLVM’s intermediate
code representation (IR), a generic assembly language
in the static single assignment (SSA) form [18]. Thus,
SPEX is applicable to software programs written in pro-
gramming languages that can be compiled into LLVM
IR. In our evaluation, we use Clang as the front-end tool
to compile C/C++ source code into LLVM IR.
3 Use Cases of Conﬁguration Constraints
3.1 Harden Systems against Conﬁguration
Errors
Given the conﬁguration constraints inferred by SPEX,
we take one step further. We build a misconﬁguration
injection-based testing tool called SPEX-INJ, to expose
misconﬁguration vulnerabilities. SPEX-INJ automati-
cally generatesconﬁgurationerrorsbyviolatingthecon-
straints inferred by SPEX. Then, it injects the errors to
the conﬁguration settings and tests how the system re-
acts. If the system does not react well (e.g., crashes,
hangs, failures), SPEX-INJ reports the bad reactions to
the developers. By ﬁxing these vulnerabilities (e.g.,
adding checks and log messages to detect and pinpoint
the errors),developerscan hardensystems against users’
misconﬁgurations, and allow users to quickly ﬁnd their
conﬁgurationerrorsso as to ﬁx the errors by themselves.
Misconﬁguration Generation and Injection: Table 2
summarizes how SPEX-INJ generates conﬁguration er-
rors by intentionally violating the inferred constraints.
Each misconﬁguration includes one or several erro-
250ފlog.filesizeފ: 32-bit INTEGER (Storage-A)
(a) Basic-type violation
ފft_stopword_fileފ: FILE (MySQL-5.5.29)
(b) Semantic-type Violation (FILE)
ފudp_portފ: PORT (Squid-2.3.5)
(c) Semantic-type Violation (PORT)
System crash! (caused by segmentation fault)
Bad Reaction Exposed:
ft_stopword_file = a_directory_path udp_port = an_occupied_port
Abort with the misleading log message:
ފFATAL: Cannot open ICP Portފ
Bad Reaction Exposed:
ފcommit_siblingsފ silently takes no effect
ft_min_word_len = 25
ft_max_word_len = 10
Incorrect results returned by full-text search.
ފindex_intlenފ: [4, 255] (OpenLDAP-2.4.33)
(d) Data-range violation (e) Control-dependency violation
ފft_min_word_lenފ < ފft_max_word_lenފ
(f) Value-relationship violation
Bad Reaction Exposed:
fsyn = off
commit_siblings = 5
Bad Reaction Exposed:
(ފfsyncފ, 0, ) ފcommit_siblingsފ
SPEX Injects: SPEX Injects:
SPEX Injects: SPEX Injects:
log.filesize = 9,000,000,000
Bad Reaction Exposed:
Change the setting to the
overflowed number
SPEX Injects:
log.filesize = 9G
Bad Reaction Exposed:
Ignore G as the unit, using
9 bytes as the size
SPEX Injects:
Bad Reaction Exposed:
index_intlen = 300
Change the setting to 255 without notifying users
(the constraint is not documented in user manual)
SPEX Injects: (PostgreSQL-9.2.1) (MySQL-5.5.29)
Figure 5: Real-world examples to illustrate the conﬁguration error generation of SPEX-INJ (based on the rules in Table 2),
and the exposed misconﬁguration vulnerabilities(bad system reactions). How the constraints are inferred from these exam-
ples is shown in Figure 3. All the vulnerabilities are detected by SPEX-INJ in the latest versions of the evaluated systems.
Constraint Generation Rules
Basic type Generate parameter values with invalid basic types
Semantic Generate invalid parameter values speciﬁc to
type different semantic types
Range Generate out-of-range values
Control dep. Generate (P ⋄ V)∧Q for (P,V,⋄)  → Q
Value relat. Generate invalid value relationships
Table 2: SPEX-INJ generates conﬁguration errors for dif-
ferent types of constraints inferred by SPEX.
neous parameter values that violate a speciﬁc constraint.
SPEX-INJ may generate several misconﬁgurations in
variousaspects for a parameter: violating the constraints
of its data type, its data range, its dependencies and cor-
relations with other parameters. Every generation rule
is implemented as a plug-in, which can be extended for
customization. Figure 5 lists several real-world exam-
ples for each rule along with the exposedvulnerabilities.
SPEX-INJ injects misconﬁgurations by replacing the
default parameter values with the generated erroneous
values in conﬁguration ﬁles. We use the conﬁguration
ﬁle parser in ConfErr [15] to parse a template conﬁgura-
tion ﬁle into an abstract representation (AR), and trans-
form the modiﬁed AR with errors injected to a usable
conﬁguration ﬁle for testing. In fact, other conﬁguration
ﬁle parsing tools such as Augeas can also be used.
Category of Misconﬁguration Vulnerabilities (Bad
System Reactions): When a misconﬁguration occurs,
the system should pinpoint either the misconﬁgured pa-
rameter’s name/value or its location information (e.g.,
linenumbersintheﬁle). Otherwise, SPEX-INJ considers
the system reaction as a misconﬁguration vulnerability.
Table 3 categorizes different types of misconﬁgura-
tion vulnerabilities. The ﬁrst category, system crashes
and hangs, is considered as severe vulnerabilities, espe-
cially for server applications where availability is cru-
Reaction Description
Crash/Hang The system crashes or hangs.
Early The system exits without pinpointing the
termination injected conﬁguration error.
Functional The system fails functional testing without
failure pinpointing the injected error.
Silent The system changes input conﬁgurations to
violation different values without notifying users.
Silent The system ignores input conﬁgurations
ignorance (mainly for control-dependency violation).
Table 3: The category of bad system reactions.
cial. Such symptoms would mislead users and sup-
port engineers to suspect them as software bugs. The
second category, early termination without pinpointing
message, is also undesirable. In this case, the system
terminates itself but does not give useful feedback for
users to ﬁx the problemsby themselves. Similarly, func-
tion failureswithoutpinpointingerrormessages canalso
confuse users, as shown in the MySQL example in Fig-
ure 5(f). As for the last two categories, it is still unac-
ceptable (maybe less severe) to silently violate or ignore
the users’ intention, which might cause users’ confusion
or sophisticated problems(e.g., performanceissues, fea-
ture not activated), as shown in Figure 5(a) and (d).
In this paper, we do not consider performance issues
caused by misconﬁgurations, mainly because of the dif-
ﬁculties in objectively judging whether the performance
is acceptable. Unless the performance degradation af-
fectsthesystemusability(belongingto“hang”),wecon-
sider it acceptable as long as the functionality is correct.
Testing and Analysis: SPEX-INJ leverages each soft-
ware’s own test infrastructure, including test cases and
test oracles, for accepting/rejectingtest results. For each
generated conﬁguration ﬁle (containing one misconﬁg-
uration), SPEX-INJ ﬁrst launches the target system. If
the system successfully starts, SPEX-INJ will further ap-
251ply existingfunctionaltest cases oneby oneand monitor
the system status and output. During testing, SPEX-INJ
recordsall thesystem andconsolelogs. Ifthe test results
fail to pass the test oracles, SPEX-INJ checks the logs to
see whether the system pinpoints the misconﬁguration.
If not, it generates an error report for the developers.
The errorreport (the outputof SPEX-INJ) contains the
constraint, the injected error, and the failed test cases,
associated with all the log messages. Therefore, the de-
velopers can know what misconﬁgurations caused what
problems. SPEX-INJ reportssilent violation/ignoranceif
the system does not pinpoint errors but passes testing.
The testing process can be slow, as N ×T, where N
is the number of misconﬁgurations SPEX-INJ generates
and T is the time to run all input test cases once. To
shorten the time, we apply two optimizations. First, for
each misconﬁguration, SPEX-INJ stops immediately af-
ter the ﬁrst failed test case. Second, we sort the running
time of each test case and run the shortest test case ﬁrst.
By using these optimizations, the testing time of SPEX-
INJ on the evaluated software is under 10 hours. Note:
This is a one-time cost because SPEX-INJ can be made
incrementally. Only those constraints affected by code
modiﬁcation during each revision need to be retested.
3.2 Detect Error-Prone Design
Conﬁguration settings which are expected to be per-
formed by users, should be intuitive and less prone to
errors. Carefully-designed conﬁguration constraints can
prevent users’ confusion and mistakes. More speciﬁ-
cally, since the conﬁguration setting is also one type of
software interface exposed to the users, it should follow
the interface design principles [20,23].
We expect conﬁguration design to be (1) consistent in
constraints of different parameters, (2) explicit to users
when changing (violating) their settings, and (3) com-
plete in documenting the requirements of parameters
(i.e., constraints). In this section, we show how to lever-
age the constraints to detect error-prone conﬁguration
design and handling that break these three principles.
Design Inconsistency: Consistency is a primary in-
terface design principle to prevent user mistakes. The
inferred constraints provide opportunities for detecting
two types of conﬁguration inconsistency: (1) case sen-
sitivity, and (2) unit granularity. Such inconsistency is
error-pronebecauseusersarelikelyconfusedbythecon-
tradictory requirements for parameters of same types.
Figures 6(a) and (b) show two real-world examples
of the two types of constraint inconsistency. In Fig-
ure 6(a), different from most string case-insensitive con-
ﬁguration parameters in MySQL, the values of param-
eter “innodb ﬁle format check” are case sensitive. In
(a) Inconsistency of case sensitivity (b) Inconsistency of parameter units
MySQL-5.5.29 Apache httpd-2.4.3
/* storage/innobase/srv/srv0start.c */ /* server/mpm_common.c */
Most size parameters in Apa-
che use "byte" as the unit.
value = strtol(arg, NULL, 10);
Most enum options in MySQL
are insensitive (strcasecmp)!
unit: "Kilobyte"
ӀMaxMemFreeӀ
if (!strcmp(method, "fsync")) {
} else if (!strcmp(method, "O_DSYNC")) {
...
...
(c) Silent Overruling
/* src/cache_cf.cc */
(d) Using unsafe API
/* src/Parsing.cc */ ފyesފ and ފenableފ are
treated as ފoffފ silently
if (!strcasecmp(token, ފonފ)) {
*var = 1;
} else {
*var = 0;
} The return value of invalid
input is undefined.
int i;
sscanf(token, ފ%iފ, &i);
//use the value
input from users
input from users
ap_max_mem_free = value * 1024;
...
...
Squid-2.3.5 Squid-2.3.5
Ӏinnodb_file_format_checkӀ
Figure 6: Real-world examples of error-prone conﬁgura-
tion design and handling in source code.
Figure 6(b), different from the other size parameters in
Apache that use Bytes as the unit, “MaxMemFree” uses
KBytes as the unit. Therefore, users can easily make
mistakes here due to the inconsistency. As shown in
Section 4.1, we ﬁnd that more than half of the evaluated
systems have these two kinds of inconsistency.
The inconsistency is detected based on SPEX’s infer-
ence of semantic-typeconstraints. Rememberthat SPEX
records the API calls that use the parameters. The case
sensitivity is inferred by identifying string comparison
functions. If the parameter is used in comparison func-
tions like strcasecmp, it is case insensitive. Otherwise
it is sensitive when used in functions like strcmp. Sim-
ilarly, the unit information is inferred according to the
API’s unit. For example,parametersused in sleephave
the unit second, while parameters used in usleep are of
unit microsecond. We also consider the transformation
of the parameter, along its data-ﬂow path before it falls
into the API call, as shown in Figure 6(b).
Silent Overruling: Silent overruling refers to the case
thatthe systemchangesanunacceptableusersetting into
thedefaultvaluewithoutnotifyingtheuser. It maycause
silent violation of user intention as one type of mis-
conﬁguration vulnerabilities. As shown in Figure 6(c),
Squid silently treats any boolean parameter as “off” as
long as it is not set to “on”, even if its value is “yes” or
“enable”. Such design can easily confuse users because
the system behavior would not match their expectation.
To detect silent overruling, for enumerative range
constraints inferred in “if...else if...else” or
switch logics, if the parameter is silently overwritten
in the else block or default case, we ﬂag it as silent
overruling. In Squid and Apache, we detect many silent
overrulingcasesthataffected74parameters. Allofthese
have been ﬁxed by developers after we reported them.
252We do not consider static initialization of conﬁgura-
tion parameters as silent overruling. It is mainly used to
assign default values that would be overwritten by user
settings. Thus, it is not relevant to users’ conﬁguration.
Unsafe APIs: Using unsafe APIs in conﬁguration han-
dling can also create confusing behavior. For example,
unsafe string-to-number transformation APIs, including
atoi, sscanfand sprintfarevulnerabletoerroneous
user inputs. Taking atoi as an example, there is no way
to check unexpected characters [atoi(1O0) returns 1]
andoverﬂowissues [atoi(INT MAX)returns -1]. These
APIs are handy in controlled contexts but should be
avoided in conﬁguration parsing since user inputs may
not be trustworthy and can easily be misspelled [39]. In-
stead, agoodpracticeis tousesafeAPIs suchas strtol
and check errors through errno and end pointers. Most
bugdetectiontoolsdonotreportthesevulnerabilitiesbe-
cause they cannot know whether a variable comes from
user settings. SPEX can detect them exactly because it is
starting from parameter settings. Our evaluation shows
that manysystems use unsafe APIs, affectinglargenum-
bers of parameters as exempliﬁed in Figure 6(d).
Undocumented Constraints: The inferred constraints
are also useful for developers to check whether the con-
straints are documented in any form (e.g., user manu-
als, error messages, or even accurate parameter nam-
ing). Our evaluationshows that some conﬁgurationcon-
straints haveneverbeendocumentedin anyform. As the
consequence,users can easily make mistakes with them.
4 Evaluation
We evaluate the effectiveness of our tools using one
commercial system and six open-source systems as
listed in Table 4. The commercial system, Storage-A, is
froma majorstoragevendorin theU.S. It is a distributed
operating system used for managing network attached
storage devices. It serves storage over networks using
both ﬁle-based protocols (including NFS, CIFS, FTP,
HTTP) and block-based protocols (including FC, FCoE,
iSCSI). The system provides users with a large number
of conﬁguration parameters. The open-source systems
are mature, widely-usedserverapplicationswith consid-
erable numbers of conﬁguration parameters.
The test cases we use to drive SPEX-INJ are from the
test suites shippedwith the softwareprojectsorprovided
by the developers. To collect related warning and error
log messages, we set sufﬁcient logging verbosity.
Table 4 also shows the numbers of annotations we
added in each software so that SPEX can use them as
the starting points to identify and analyze conﬁguration-
related variables in source code. As shown in Table 4,
the annotation efforts in terms of lines are acceptable.
Software Proprietary LoC #Parameter LoA
Storage-A Commercial – – 5
Apache Open source 148K 103 4
MySQL Open source 1.2M 272 29
PostgreSQL Open source 757K 231 7
OpenLDAP Open source 292K 86 4
VSFTP Open source 16K 124 5
Squid Open source 180K 335 2
Table 4: Evaluated software systems. “–”: We are re-
quired to keep the concrete numbers of Storage-A conﬁ-
dential. “LoA” is the abbreviation of lines of annotations.
4.1 Overall Results
We ﬁrst present the end results exposed by SPEX-INJ:
the misconﬁguration vulnerabilities (bad system reac-
tions) and error-prone conﬁguration design and han-
dling. Later in Section 4.3, we will show the interme-
diate results: the constraints inferred by SPEX.
Misconﬁguration Vulnerabilities: Table 5(a) shows
the number of misconﬁgurationvulnerabilities (bad sys-
tem reactions) exposed in the latest versions of the eval-
uated systems. SPEX-INJ exposes a total of 743 vulner-
abilities (they are true vulnerabilities veriﬁed by us). To
thisday,364ofthemhavebeenconﬁrmedorﬁxedbythe
developers. The vulnerabilities exposed by SPEX-INJ
are of various kinds in all the evaluated systems. Most
notably,all the open-sourcesystems experiencedbad re-
actions such as crashes, hangs, and early terminations
under some misconﬁgurations. In addition, silent vio-
lation and ignorance are more prevalent compared with
terminations and failures. This once again reﬂects that
developers pay less attention to defending against mis-
conﬁgurations as long as they do not affect the system’s
own execution. Figure 7 gives ﬁve additional examples
for each type of vulnerabilities exposed by SPEX-INJ.
Since one source-code location could affect the con-
straints of several conﬁguration parameters, Table 5(b)
further shows the number of unique code locations that
cause these vulnerabilities. The 743 vulnerabilities are
causedby 448locationsin sourcecode,and the 364con-
ﬁrmed bad reactions can be ﬁxed by 97 code patches.
Error-Prone Conﬁguration Design and Handing:
Table 6 shows the distribution of the case-sensitivity re-
quirementsforstring parametersin each system. We can
see that more than half of the systems have inconsistent
case-sensitivity requirements. The inconsistent require-
ments of 80 parameters in Apache, MySQL, and Squid
have been conﬁrmed and ﬁxed after we reported them.
Table 7 shows the unit requirements for size and time
parameters. More than half of the systems have incon-
sistentsize andtimeunits. Forexample,inStorage-A,20
size parameters use Bytes as their units except three pa-
253Software Crash/ Early Functional Silent Silent Total Hang terminat. failure violation ignor.
Storage-A 0 (0) 0 (0) 7 (5) 74 (72) 83 (0) 164 (77)
Apache 5 (2) 4 (3) 9 (3) 29 (2) 5 (1) 52 (11)
MySQL 5 (5) 10 (3) 12 (4) 71 (70) 16 (0) 114 (82)
PostgreSQL 1 (0) 10 (1) 2 (0) 1 (0) 35 (2) 49 (3)
OpenLDAP 1 (0) 3 (0) 6 (0) 7 (0) 0 (0) 17 (0)
VSFTP 12 (12) 5 (0) 18 (0) 23 (0) 68 (0) 126 (12)
Squid 2 (2) 3 (2) 29 (1) 173 (173) 14 (1) 221 (179)
Total 26 (21) 35 (9) 83 (13) 378 (317) 221 (4) 743 (364)
(a) Misconﬁguration vulnerabilities (bad system reactions)
Software Source-code
location
Storage-A 119 (34)
Apache 52 (1)
MySQL 46 (16)
PostgreSQL 44 (3)
OpenLDAP 17 (0)
VSFTP 107 (12)
Squid 62 (21)
Total 448 (97)
(b) Corresponding code locations
Table 5: The number of exposed misconﬁguration vulnerabilities, and the corresponding source-code locations. A patch
to one source-code location might ﬁx multiple vulnerabilities. The numbers in “()” are the numbers of conﬁrmed or ﬁxed
cases by the developers after we reported them. The cases that have not been conﬁrmed are discussed in Section 5.1.
Bad Reaction Exposed:
Crash
SPEX Injects:
performance_schema_events_ \
waits_history_size = 0
SPEX Injects:
ThreadLimit = 100000
SPEX Injects:
sockbuf_max_incoming 1
SPEX Injects:
pcs.size = 512MB
No System Log
System Log:
Segmentation fault (core
dumped)
Bad Reaction Exposed:
Ignore MB and use 512GB
(default unit) as pcs.size
MySQL-5.5.29 Apache httpd-2.4.3
Bad Reaction Exposed:
Abort during startup
System Log:
Cannot allocate memory: AH00004:
Unable to create access scoreboard
(anonymous shared memory failure)
Storage-A OpenLDAP-2.4.33
Bad Reaction Exposed:
Any client request leads to:
ފCan't contact LDAP server (-1)ފ
System Log:
conn=xx ACCEPT from IP=x.x.x.x
conn=xx closed (connection lost)
(a) System Crash
(crash/hang)
(b) Early termination with
misleading message
(c) Functional failure without
pinpointing message
(d) Silently change user inputs
(silent violation)
(e) Silently ignore user inputs
(silent ignorance)
VSFTP-3.0.2
SPEX Injects:
virtual_use_local_privs = yes
one_process_mode = yes
Bad Reaction Exposed:
The setting of ފvirtual_use_\
local_privsފ has no effect
No System Log
Figure 7: Examples of different types of misconﬁguration vulnerabilities (categorized in Table 3) exposed by SPEX-INJ.
Software
Case sensitivity Developers’
Sensitive Insensitive ﬁxes
Storage-A 32 (7.1%) 453 (92.9%) being investigated
Apache 3 (11.5%) 26 (88.5%) all sens.→insens.
MySQL 1 (1.7%) 58 (98.3%) all sens.→insens.
PostgreSQL 0 (0.0%) 92 (100.0%) N/A
OpenLDAP 0 (0.0%) 9 (100.0%) N/A
VSFTP 0 (0.0%) 73 (100.0%) N/A
Squid 85 (52.8%) 76 (47.2%) all insens.→sens.
Table 6: Case-sensitivity requirements of different conﬁg-
uration parameters in the evaluated systems.
rameters, each of which uses different unit size, namely
KBytes, MBytes, and GBytes. Storage-A mitigates the
inconsistencyvianaming,includingtheunitinformation
in parameternames(c.f., Section 5.2). However,noneof
theopen-sourcesystems makessucheffort,so theincon-
sistencies may confuse users and cause mistakes.
Table 8 shows other types of error-prone constraints.
SPEX detects 74 parameters with silent overruling in
Apache and Squid, all of which were ﬁxed by the de-
velopers after we reported them. In addition, more than
half of the systems use unsafe transformation APIs for
large numbers of parameters. Moreover, a number of
inferred constraints are not documented in any form.
However, it might be arguable whether the cases in
Table 7 and 8 are really confusing and error-prone to
Software Size Time
B KB MB GB µs ms s m h
Storage-A 20 1 1 1 2 10 53 12 4
Apache 20 1 0 0 0 1 26 0 0
MySQL 29 0 0 0 2 2 13 0 0
PostgreSQL 1 3 0 0 1 12 9 1 0
OpenLDAP 2 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0
VSFTP 1 0 0 0 0 0 6 0 0
Squid 18 2 0 0 1 6 33 0 0
Table 7: The different units of size- and time-related con-
ﬁguration parameters in the evaluated systems.
Software
Silent Unsafe Undoc. Constraints
over- trans- Data Ctrl Val.
ruling form. range dep. rel.
Storage-A 0 28 2 0 2
Apache 1 27 0 1 0
MySQL 0 0 4 3 1
PostgreSQL 0 0 3 3 2
OpenLDAP 0 0 2 0 0
VSFTP 0 20 3 47 1
Squid 73 115 3 4 4
Table 8: Other types of error-prone conﬁguration design
and handling in the evaluated systems.
users. To be conservative, we did not report them to
the developers. For the same reason, we did not include
them in the results presented in the abstract and intro-
duction sections.
254Software Parameter Bad reactions that can be
misconﬁg. potentially avoided by SPEX
Storage-A 246 68 (27.6%)
Apache 50 19 (38.0%)
MySQL 47 14 (29.8%)
OpenLDAP 49 12 (24.5%)
Table 9: Real-world misconﬁguration cases that can be
potentially avoided among all sampled historic cases.
Software Inference incapability Conform to Good
Single-SW Cross-SW constraints reactions
Storage-A 19 (7.7%) 51 (20.7%) 76 (30.9%) 32 (13.0%)
Apache 5 (10.0%) 12 (24.0%) 9 (18.0%) 5 (10.0%)
MySQL 1 (2.1%) 12 (25.5%) 18 (38.3%) 2 (4.3%)
OpenLDAP 9 (18.4%) 4 (8.2%) 12 (24.5%) 12 (24.5%)
Table 10: The breakdown of misconﬁguration cases
that cannot beneﬁt from SPEX/SPEX-INJ. “Conform con-
straint” and “Good reactions” are explained in the text.
4.2 Beneﬁts to Real-World Conﬁguration
Problems
It is hard to predict the beneﬁts of SPEX in avoiding fu-
ture misconﬁguration reports and in reducing miscon-
ﬁguration diagnosis time. To provide some estimation
of the end beneﬁts, we have to leverage past misconﬁg-
uration cases committed by real users and evaluate how
many customer reports could have been avoided if our
tools had been used. Note: The results in this section
are from the perspective of system vendors. We do not
consider the users’ downtime and frustration.
We study real-world historical misconﬁgurationcases
from four systems: Storage-A, Apache, MySQL, and
OpenLDAP. For Storage-A, we randomly sampled 246
parameter misconﬁguration cases from the company’s
customer issue database. For open-source applications,
we randomlycollected 177 parameter misconﬁgurations
from ofﬁcial forums, mailing lists, and ServerFault.com
(a popular system administration forum). The data have
been presented in our early paper [36].
As shown in Table 9, 24%–38% of the misconﬁgura-
tion cases could have been potentially avoided if SPEX
had been used to improve the conﬁguration design and
harden the system against misconﬁgurations. The re-
sultsmaynotsoundimpressive. However,ifweconsider
the total number of conﬁguration issues encountered in
today’s server systems, eliminating approximately one-
third of the issues is noteworthy. Here, we consider all
parameter-related conﬁguration errors as the denomina-
tor. The percentages will be larger if we consider only
one subtype such as illegal misconﬁgurations [36]. As
a ﬁrst step in the direction of improving conﬁguration
design, we believe that 24%–38% is a promising result.
Toguidefutureresearchinthisdirection,Table10fur-
ther breaks down the misconﬁguration cases that cannot
Software
Data type Data Ctrl Value
Basic Semtc range dep. rel.
Storage-A 922 111 490 81 20
Apache 103 22 42 1 9
MySQL 272 74 213 35 10
PostgreSQL 231 52 186 44 6
OpenLDAP 75 15 20 0 2
VSFTP 130 34 84 68 1
Squid 258 46 120 14 9
Total 1991 354 1155 243 57
Table 11: Conﬁguration constraints inferred by SPEX.
Software Data type Data Ctrl Value
Basic Semtc range dep. rel.
Storage-A 97.0% 95.7% 87.1% 84.1% 94.1%
Apache 96.1% 91.7% 94.6% 100.0% 81.8%
MySQL 100.0% 98.7% 99.1% 94.7% 71.4%
PostgreSQL 100.0% 96.3% 97.3% 91.7% 85.7%
OpenLDAP 88.2% 93.7% 73.1% N/A 50.0%
VSFTP 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 63.9% 100.0%
Squid 77.0% 100.0% 100.0% 77.8% 100.0%
Table 12: Accuracy of constraint inference.
beneﬁt from our tools. First, as discussed in Section 2.3,
SPEX cannot infer all the conﬁguration constraints. In
addition, a conﬁguration setting might conform to the
constraints, but does not match the users’ intention. For
example, a permission setting might be valid from the
constraints’ perspective, but insufﬁcient for the user to
access ﬁles. Finally, even if the system already provides
“good reactions” by our criteria (i.e., printing log mes-
sages containing the faulting parameters), users might
still report the problem because the semantics of the text
messages might be confusing.
4.3 Conﬁguration Constraint Inference
Table 11 breaks down different kinds of constraints in-
ferredby SPEX. It infers a total of 3800 constraints from
the evaluated systems. We can see that basic types can
be inferred for most conﬁguration parameters. In com-
parison, the number of semantic types is much smaller.
SPEX cannot extract the semantic type for every param-
eter. It can only infer the semantic type if the param-
eter interacts with known APIs. Data range and inter-
parameter correlations, especially control dependencies,
are also common in the evaluated systems.
Table 12 shows the accuracy of constraint inference.
We manually and carefully examined all of the 3800
constraints inferred by SPEX. SPEX achieves over 90%
inference accuracy in most cases. We ﬁnd that the inac-
curacy is mainly caused by pointer aliasing. If a conﬁg-
uration parameter is pointed by aliased pointers, and/or
there are complicated pointer arithmetic logic, SPEX
may lose the correct mappingfrom the conﬁgurationpa-
rameter to the program variable, and thereby infer con-
255straints that do not belong to the right parameter. Cur-
rently, SPEX doesnotperformanypointer-aliasanalysis.
This explains why OpenLDAP has the lowest accuracy:
many of its parameters are referenced through pointers.
However,our overall accuracyis still over 90%, because
most of the conﬁguration parameters are not aliased.
5 Experience and Practice
5.1 Interaction Experience
We reported the detected vulnerabilities and error-prone
constraints to developers through the ofﬁcial bug report-
ingsystems. To this day,364ofourreportedvulnerabili-
ties and 80 inconsistent constraints have been conﬁrmed
or ﬁxed by the developers. The others are ignored or
rejected or being investigated. Here, we share our expe-
riences in interacting with developers.
Positive Experience. We are encouraged by the pos-
itive feedback from many developers of the evaluated
systems, and we appreciate their help.
• Storage-A: Misconﬁgurations account for one-third
of the customer issues of Storage-Ain this major U.S.
storage company. It has incurred signiﬁcant ﬁnancial
cost for troubleshooting these issues. Therefore, they
activelyinvestigatesolutionstomisconﬁgurationsand
have been very supportive to our work, including pro-
vidingus with sourcecode,test cases, andallowingus
to includeStorage-A’s results in this paper. All the ex-
posed issues have been sent to the corresponding de-
veloping teams. Many of them have been ﬁxed (c.f.,
Table 5), and others are under investigation.
• Squid: The developers immediately paid great atten-
tion to our reported misconﬁguration vulnerabilities.
We worked together and improvedtheir conﬁguration
parsing library by adding more checks for conﬁgura-
tion errors and more logging in reporting errors.
Negative Experience. Not all interaction with develop-
ers is positive. Some of our reports and patches so far
have been rejected or ignored. The following summa-
rize the typical negative responses: (1) Some developers
think the information is clearly described in the docu-
ment, so there is no need for systems to check or to pin-
point the conﬁguration errors in log messages — “The
manual states, near the top...” However, users may not
read manuals line by line, especially given that manu-
als for large systems are usually lengthy (e.g., MySQL-
5.5’s manual has 4502 pages). Also, users may have
problems understanding manual contents because many
userscomefroma differentbackground. (2)Someopen-
source developers tend to assume that administrators
read source code (since it is open sourced) when they
conﬁguresystems. In the response to one of ourpatches,
the developer wrote, “Most users never adjust these val-
ues. Thosewho do,readthe code.” Note: Users canread
open-sourcecode, but this does not mean that users have
time orarewilling toreadthe code. (3)Somedevelopers
optimistically assume that users will not make mistakes,
“If you work exactly and carefully, it does not matter;
if not, you should not maintain the server at all.” As
a result, it is not uncommon that developers closed the
report with comments like, “This is not a bug.” The im-
plication is that “the user must be a novice or not think-
ing.” However, such optimistic assumptions are often
proved unrealistic as partially demonstrated in our work
and previous work on misconﬁguration.
The negative experiences indicate that the battle to
have developers take an active role in misconﬁgura-
tion handling is challenging. The main impediment is
the controversial responsibilities of misconﬁgurations
between users and developers. Often, it is only until
the system suffers considerable support cost or failures
(caused by misconﬁgurations)will the importanceof ac-
tive handling be appreciated by developers. We believe
one way to raise this awareness is through education
onuser-friendlyconﬁgurationdesign,hopefullyleverag-
ing the trend and attention in good user-interface design
raised by Apple’s success. As articulated in [24], devel-
opers should view system administrators and operators
as their ﬁrst-class users.
5.2 Practice
We highlight some of the good practices we have ob-
served from the evaluated software projects.
Hiding Critical Conﬁgurations from Users: Despite
the trend that systems expose more and more conﬁgu-
ration knobs to users, some systems choose to hide ad-
vanced and critical parameters from users, in order to
avoid careless mistakes. Storage-A provides two lev-
els of conﬁguration interfaces: one for normal users and
the other for advanced administrators. Moreover,it does
not allow users to directly modify system conﬁguration
ﬁles. Users’ conﬁguration settings are enforced to go
through the interfaces which perform basic checking. In
fact, developers sometimes are struggling with the con-
ﬁgurability. For example, eight Squid parameters have
the following explanation in their manual entries:
“Heavy voodoo here. I can’t even believe you
are reading this. Are you crazy? Don’t even
think about adjusting these unless you under-
stand the algorithms in comm select.c ﬁrst!”
A good practice should hide such esoteric parameters
from users, or forewarn users with clear log messages
when they are trying to conﬁgure these parameters.
256Handling Inconsistency: We observe two efforts in
Storage-A in handling unit inconsistency. First, the unit
information is exposed in naming (e.g., “cleanup.msec”,
“takeover.sec”) which serves as both constraint descrip-
tions and mnemonics for users. Second, some parame-
ter settings enforce users to specify unit sufﬁxes to help
them express their intention explicitly.
Exploiting Data Structures: Storage-A, MySQL, and
PostgreSQLuseglobaldatastructureswhichenforcede-
velopersto specify thedata typeand the minimum,max-
imum value for each conﬁguration parameter. In this
way, the systems easily enforce uniform validity check-
ing for conﬁguration settings. Consequently, they have
fewer misconﬁguration vulnerabilities that violate type
and range constraints, as shown in Table 5.
6 Related Work
The major research efforts in addressing misconﬁgura-
tion problems focus on detecting [11,35,38] and trou-
bleshooting [1,3,4,5,21,25,32,33,34,37,40] conﬁgura-
tion errors in a timely manner. While these studies pro-
vide remedies to ﬁnd root causes of misconﬁguration-
induced system failures and anomalies, it is often too
late to alleviate users from frustrating experiences.
Our work is different but complementary to miscon-
ﬁguration detection and troubleshooting. We propose
to improve the conﬁguration design, to harden systems
with graceful reactions to misconﬁgurations, and to pro-
vide users with explicit log messages so as to enable
users to ﬁx conﬁguration errors by themselves. Doing
these can help eliminate many conﬁguration errors, or
at least help users self-diagnose the problems quickly
(based on system error messages) without the need to
run any extra detection or troubleshooting tools. Al-
though we have made only a modest step in this direc-
tion, we strongly believe that having developers take a
moreactive role to improveconﬁgurationdesignand an-
ticipate/tolerate conﬁguration errors should be the ulti-
mate solution (maybe not immediately achievable).
ConfErr [15] pioneers the conﬁguration testing di-
rection. Since it is not guided by conﬁguration con-
straints, it makes generic alternations to valid conﬁgu-
ration settings (e.g., omissions, substitutions, and case
alternations of characters). Similarly, fuzz testing can be
used to generate random data as conﬁguration settings.
Our work is complementary to ConfErr and fuzz test-
ing. Themajorpartofourworkfocusesonconﬁguration
constraint inference. Based on the inferred constraints,
our injection are guided to be program- and constraint-
speciﬁc. Take therangeconstraintas anexample, SPEX-
INJ generates values exactly covering in and out of the
speciﬁc range. Besides misconﬁguration injection, we
alsoleveragetheconstraintstodetecterror-proneconﬁg-
urationdesignandhandling. Althoughnotdemonstrated
in the paper, the inferred constraints can also be used as
references for developers or UI engineers to examine if
the conﬁgurationconstraints are too complicated or un-
natural, or not backward-compatible, etc.
Rabkin and Katz extract conﬁguration parameters
together with their data types from Hadoop-like pro-
grams[26]. Ourworkdiffersfromtheirsinthefollowing
three aspects. First, we have different objectives. Their
objective is to understand the types of conﬁguration pa-
rameters, whereas ours is to advocate and enable devel-
opers to take an active role in reducing conﬁguration-
related issues. Second, their work focuses on data types
only, whereas our work also extracts other kinds of con-
straints includingdata ranges, controldependencies,and
value relationships. Third, their work focuses on the
characteristics but shows no use case of the extracted
information, whereas our work uses the inferred con-
straints to exposemisconﬁgurationvulnerabilitiesandto
detect error-prone conﬁguration design and handling.
7 Conclusion
This paper advocates the importance for software de-
velopers to take an active role in handling misconﬁgu-
rations. It makes a concrete useful step by providing
tooling support for developers to expose misconﬁgura-
tion vulnerabilities, and detect error-proneconﬁguration
design and handling. Our tools have exposed 743 vul-
nerabilities and at least 112 error-prone constraints in
both commercial and open-source systems. To this day,
364 vulnerabilities, together with 80 inconsistent con-
straints, have been conﬁrmed or ﬁxed by developers af-
ter we reported them. Our results have inﬂuenced the
Squid Web proxy project to improve its conﬁguration
parsing library towards a more user friendly design. We
hope our work can inspire developers to improve their
practices as well as follow-up research in this direction.
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